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Background: The introduction of the National Health Service (NHS) Breast Screening Programme has led to a
considerable increase in the detection of impalpable breast cancer. Patients with impalpable breast cancer typically
undergo oncological resection facilitated either by the insertion of guide wires placed stereo-tactically or through
ultra-sound guided skin markings to delineate the extent of a lesion. The need for radiological interventions on the
day of surgery adds complexity and introduces the risk that a patient may accidentally transferred to the operating
room directly without the image guidance procedure.
Case report: A case is described of a patient who required a pre-operative ultrasound scan in order to localise an
impalpable breast cancer but who was accidentally taken directly to the operating theatre (OR) and anaesthetised
without pre-operative intervention. The radiologist was called to the OR and an on-table ultrasound was performed
without further consequence.
Conclusion: It is evident that breast cancer patients undergoing image-guided resection are exposed to an
additional layer of clinical risks. These risks are not offset by the World Health Organisation surgical safety checklist
in its present guise. Here, we review a number of simple and inexpensive changes to the system that may improve
the safety of the breast cancer patient undergoing surgery.
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The National Health Service (NHS) Breast Screening
Programme led to the detection of over 17,000 new
breast cancers between 2009–2010 [1]. Approximately
50 % of surgically treated screen detected cancers had an
invasive tumour diameter of less than 15 mm1. Impalp-
able breast cancers require radiological localisation to
guide the surgeon as to the approximate location of the
lesion within the breast and to help determine the extent
of the oncological resection. Localisation is commonly
achieved through the use of either guide wires placed
stereo-tactically or skin markings under ultrasound
guidance. The necessity for pre-operative image-guided* Correspondence: d.hadjiminas@breastsurgeon.co.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orinterventions introduces additional challenges for the pa-
tient (e.g. anxiety, additional psychological morbidity, phys-
ical pain associate with wire insertion, etc); the surgeon (i.e.
planning, scheduling) and surgical teams (e.g. confirmation
that all the necessary pre-operative procedures have been
conducted).
Surgeons and surgical teams have of course always been
safety conscious. However, systematic studies of error and
harm in healthcare have revealed high levels of adverse
events, many of which concern surgery [2-4]. In recent
years studies of process failures, communication, team-
work, interruptions and distractions have now identified
multiple vulnerabilities implicit within systems of surgical
care [5-8]. We consider that the case discussed here
exposes a number of important weaknesses in the process
of care of breast cancer patients undergoing surgery [9].. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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A 59-year old Afrocaribbean lady was recently referred
to our hospital following confirmation of screen detected
left breast cancer. As the lesion was only just palpable,
the patient had undergone an image guided biopsy of
the radiological abnormality at the host screening centre.
Histological assessment of the breast biopsy confirmed
invasive ductal carcinoma (IDC). The patient’s case was
discussed at a multidisciplinary team (MDT) meeting
with review of breast imaging which confirmed the pres-
ence of a highly suspicious density in the upper outer
quadrant of the left breast (Figure 1), compatible with
the site of the known IDC. The agreed plan was for the
patient to undergo a wide local excision of the left breast
lesion and sentinel lymph node biopsy. Moreover, it was
agreed that she would also require a pre-operative
ultrasound-guided skin marking on the morning of sur-
gery in order to guide the extent of the breast resection.
She arrived on the morning of her operation and as
per hospital protocol was taken to the admissions area
for routine checks and observations by the nursing staff
as well as to facilitate the consenting process by the sur-
gical team. She was the first patient on the afternoon op-
erating list. The surgical registrar went to see the
patient, confirmed the clinical history, imaging findings,
histopathological results and MDT recommendations.
The patient was informed of the risks and benefits of the
proposed procedure as well as the need for image-
guided skin marking to assist resectional surgery and it
was explained that this would occur prior to her being
transferred to the operating theatre. The patient ap-
peared to understand the process, the risks and benefits
and duly signed the consent form. The registrar went to
the breast imaging department to ensure that the radiol-
ogists were expecting the patient for an ultrasound scan.
Prior to leaving for the imaging department the registrar
explained to the sister in charge of the ‘admissions unit’
that the patient needed to have a pre-operative ultrasoundFigure 1 Craniocaudal (CC – left panel) and Mediolateral (MLO – righ
and pathological microcalcification in the upper outer quadrant of thscan and she was not to be transferred to the anaesthetic
room until the image guided-skin marking had been
conducted. The responsible consultant surgeon, who
was otherwise engaged in clinic communicating a new
diagnosis of breast cancer to another patient, received a
telephone call from the theatre staff informing him that
the patient was anaesthetised and enquiring as to his
likely arrival time in the operating theatre. No ultra-
sound skin marking had been conducted. No-one had
contacted the surgical team to ask them if it was accept-
able to transfer the patient to the anaesthetic room. The
patient herself had not queried being transferred to the
operating theatre without a pre-operative procedure that
only a few minutes beforehand she was informed was an
absolute necessity.
The consultant radiologist due to perform the pre-
operative ultrasound scan was called to the operating
theatre, and thankfully was able to perform the image-
guided localisation ‘on-table’ without further insult. The
patient subsequently underwent the planned procedure
and histopathological assessment confirmed a com-
pletely excised 5.2 mm IDC (closest margin 5.5 mm).Discussion
The “near-miss” described here raises several important
clinical risk issues surrounding breast cancer patients who
require pre-operative procedures prior to cancer surgery.
These patients follow a complex pathway with a number
of different decision points (Figure 2). The pathways con-
strain a number of mandatory checks, such as the World
Health Organisation (WHO) surgical safety checklist [10],
that are integral to the safety of the breast cancer patient
undergoing surgery. However, the ‘near miss’ highlights a
number of intrinsic vulnerabilities in the system with re-
spect to the flow of the breast cancer patient through the
perioperative process. The weaknesses inherent in the sys-
tem can be summarised as follows:t panel) mammographic views illustrating the suspicious density
e left breast (white arrows).
Figure 2 Flow diagram illustrating the perioperative flow of patient care. Diagram to illustrate mandatory perioperative safety checks and
the flow of the breast cancer patient (depicted as a red circle) through the peri-operative process. Three separate phases of care are illustrated
(i.e. pre-operative, operative and post-operative). Safety checks important to each phase of care are highlighted (square box). In the pre-operative
phase, the patient requiring image guidance typically has to be taken to radiology in another location within the hospital and then returned to
theatre. The patient should only be able to transition phases of care (red –hashed line) when all safety checks have been conducted.
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operative and operative phase of care. As the
current case and Figure 2 illustrate, there is a
comparative asymmetry in terms of safety checks,
with a greater emphasis placed prior to, rather than
during the operative phase of care. The WHO
surgical safety checklist [10] would not have
detected nor prevented the current “near miss” as
typically the checklist is conducted after the
induction of general anaesthesia. There is a clear
necessity to formalise the safety briefing prior to
induction of general anaesthesia. This is essential,
not only to ensure that image-guidance has been
performed (if required) but that other mandatory
pre-operative manoeuvres have been conducted
(e.g. radioisotope injection for sentinel lymph node
biopsy). Formalised pre-operative safety checks
would also act as a vehicle to confirm the surgery
side, accuracy of skin markings and to check the
availability of allied equipment (e.g. breast prosthesis
for post-mastectomy reconstruction).
 Issues pertaining to patient proximity and
preoperative location. The current case highlights the
potential dangers involved if all patients (whether
image guidance procedures are required or not) are
observed pre-operatively in the same location. Clearly
the flow of patient transport in this situation will vary.
Some patient will move directly from the admissions
area to theatre and some will be transported to the
radiology department first and then subsequently back
to the admissions area prior to being taken to theanaesthetic room. This is akin to travellers all arriving
at an given airport gate ‘x’ with some people departing
for destination ‘z’ and others destined for ‘z’ via
another location ‘y’. In such a circumstance there
would be a significant chance of boarding the wrong
flight. Finally, the proximity of the admission lounge to
the operating theatre, which in the case of our NHS
Trust is only a few yards, may compound the problem
as it may prevent a clear distinction between the two
departments in the minds of the healthcare staff. There
is therefore always a risk of a patient entering an
incorrect pathway. The only factors preventing a
patient being incorrectly taken straight to the
operating theatre are a member of the surgical team
staying with the patient (often impractical);
communication between surgeon and admissions /
theatre team (failed in the current case); the theatre
‘scrub team’ interpreting the theatre list (should state
‘wire guidance’ or ‘ultrasound skin mark’ as was clearly
documented in the current case) and /or the
astuteness of the patient who queries being taken
straight to theatre, bypassing the radiology department.
 Procedural risks specific to the breast cancer
patient. It is valuable to reflect more broadly on the
specific risks to breast cancer patients that are
illuminated by the current case. Evidently, not all
breast cancer patients are the same and nor are all
breast cancer surgeries. Some patients require
pre-operative image guidance interventions, some
require pre-operative isotope and/or patent blue V
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specialist lipomodelling equipment, whilst certain
patients requiring nothing but ‘standard’ operating
equipment universal to most operating theatres in the
Western world. Those that require pre-operative
interventions or specific operative equipment are
potentially exposed to another layer of risks that are
inherent in the system. The current case highlights
the need to make these distinctions, a process that
may be aided by changing the emphasis towards safety
checks conducted in the pre-operative phase of care
(prior to induction) for breast cancer patients.
 The importance of pre-operative safety briefing.
Communication between surgical teams is critical to
patient safety. In particular, prior to starting an
operating theatre list it is the duty of the surgeon to
communicate with the anaesthetist and theatre
teams to ensure that all members are aware of the
patients being operated on and so that any unique
or specific steps can be addressed. Regarding the
current case, the briefing was succinct and focused
(i.e. list order, patients to be operated on and
operation type) and may have dealt better with
broader issue surrounding the importance of image
guidance, medical past history, and in which patient
lesions were deemed to be impalpable. Broader
preoperative safety briefings such as this have been
shown to improve communication and reduce
adverse events [11,12]. In addition to the
preoperative briefing, the theatre staff typically
inform the surgeon that the patient is about to be
transferred to the operating theatre. This is
commonly referred to as ‘sending’ for the patient.ble 1 Proposed variation on the WHO surgical safety check
hance the safety of the breast cancer patient undergoing s
ad aloud before administering general anaesthesia
s the patient confirmed their name / site of
rgery / procedure and consent?
the anaesthetic machine / medications complete?
es the patient have an allergy (especially to blue dye)?
hich breast / axilla is being operated on?
the surgical site marked?
a pre-operative localisation procedure required?
a pre-operative localisation procedure is required, has it been performed?
a SLNB procedure being conducted?
a SLNB procedure is being conducted has radioisotope injection
en administered and is patent blue V / gamma probe available?
the patient having a breast prosthesis inserted?
a breast prosthesis is required has it been ordered / available in theatre?The theatre staff did not inform the operating
surgeon that they were ‘sending’ for the patient. One
may argue that the theatre co-ordinator and
anaesthetic team should have informed the surgical
team that they had summoned the patient to
operating theatre. This may have revealed that
image-guidance had not yet taken place, thereby
circumventing the “near-miss”.
 Inability to rely on the patient to prevent errors in
flow. Surgery is extremely stressful for the patient
and they are likely to be anxious, nervous and prone
to forgetting information given to them on the day
of surgery. While patients should of course be
encouraged to speak up if they notice any
inconsistencies in their care it is not ultimately their
responsibility to monitor the safety of the process.
As highlighted here, patients’ may not challenge
healthcare staff as to the appropriateness of the
procedures they are undergoing. Had the patient
informed the theatre staff that she was due to have
an ultrasound scan then this “near miss” may not
have occurred. Clearly, one cannot rely on the
patient to prevent such an incident, and a new
process of safety checks for breast cancer patients
may be required. Of great concern is that a breast
patient can currently arrive in the operating without
a series of systematic safety checks being performed
prior to the induction of general anaesthesia.
Conclusions
What should be done to enhance patient safety? ‘Naturally,
individual centres need to implement their own specific
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lowing fundamental processes changes that may help to
enhance patient safety and prevent similar adverse events:
1. Breast cancer patients requiring pre-operative
localisation should not enter the operating theatre
space or admissions area until the wire-insertion and
/ or image-guided skin marking have been
conducted. These patients should go directly to the
radiology department on the morning of surgery.
2. Patients should not be consented by the surgical
team until the necessary localisation procedures
have occurred. This may be complicated by the fact
that pre-operative consent for wire-guided excision
is, in effect used as consent for the wire-localisation
procedure as well as the subsequent wide local
excision. Nevertheless, the absence of a signed
consent form typically acts a barrier to proceeding
with induction of general anaesthesia and would
have circumvented the current adverse event.
These strategies may reduce the risk to breast cancer
patients in our NHS Trust but are not guaranteed to
have the same effect within the wider NHS and beyond.
Ultimately, an adequate pre-operative safety briefing
along with specialty specific modifications and an adher-
ence to the WHO checklist [13,14] are more likely to
lead to a consistent and sustainable improvement in pa-
tient safety. Regarding the latter, the WHO surgical safety
checklist should be adapted for the needs of the breast
cancer patient, along the lines illustrated in Table 1. It is
worth noting that adaptations to the checklist are not
novel and similar adjustments to those proposed have
been made for cataract surgery [15]. Clearly, a breast
cancer specific checklist would place greater emphasis on
checks in the pre-operative phase including the need for
pre-operative localisation procedures, radioisotope injec-
tions, availability of gamma probes and patent blue V
injectate. Critically, in our view these checks should take
place prior to induction of general anaesthesia.
Thankfully, the current patient came to no actual harm
as a result of the “near miss” but should this adverse event
have occurred in a patient requiring stereotaxic guidance
for wire positioning, reversal of the general anaesthetic
and transfer to the x-ray department would have been
mandated. In light of this case we are exploring the pre-
operative patient pathway for breast cancer surgery in our
own Trust and are lobbying the WHO surgical safety team
to develop a more specific checklist to maximise the safety
of the breast cancer patient undergoing surgical interven-
tions within the National Health Service.Competing interests
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